Seminar: 3/7 - Jennifer Hudin
11:00 to 12:30 PM at:
Department of Philosophy, UC Berkeley
"The Neurophilosophy of Social Decisions."
It is now generally accepted in psychology that decision making is a function of two cognitive systems, one devoted to intuition and the other to reasoning. This two-system model is called the dual process theory, and is applicable to all forms of human decision making, from personal, social, to moral. In this article, I will provide a neurophilosophical argument that social-moral decisions in particular are a function of a specific capacity for social behavior and that this capacity requires a neural cognitive mechanism selected for sociality. This selective neural mechanism(s) operates in tandem with the mechanisms operating for individual-personal decision making but it is distinct from the mechanisms employed for individual-personal decisions. The conclusion is that social-moral decisions are of a different kind, both conceptually and neurologically. At the cognitive level, human decision making is a function of a triadic process system.